{"id":8420,"date":"2013-03-17T14:31:29","date_gmt":"2013-03-17T11:31:29","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.enerjigazetesi.ist\/?p=8420"},"modified":"2013-03-17T14:31:29","modified_gmt":"2013-03-17T11:31:29","slug":"irana-karsi-suud-petrol-savasi","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.enerjigazetesi.ist\/en\/irana-karsi-suud-petrol-savasi\/","title":{"rendered":"(Turkish) \u0130ran\u2019a Kar\u015f\u0131 Suud Petrol Sava\u015f\u0131…"},"content":{"rendered":"

Sorry, this entry is only available in Turkish<\/a>. For the sake of viewer convenience, the content is shown below in the alternative language. You may click the link to switch the active language.<\/p>

Prens T\u00fcrk\u00ee el Faysal, Tahran\u2019\u0131n k\u00fcresel ekonomiye petrol ihracat\u0131n\u0131n yerini alma aray\u0131\u015f\u0131yla, ge\u00e7en y\u0131l Suud\u2019un Amerikan liderli\u011findeki \u0130ran\u2019a kar\u015f\u0131 m\u00fceyyidelere kat\u0131laca\u011f\u0131n\u0131 s\u00f6ylerken yeni bir fikre g\u00f6nderme yapm\u0131yordu. \u0130\u015fin asl\u0131, S.Arabistan \u0130ran\u2019a kar\u015f\u0131 \u00f6nceki iki petrol sava\u015f\u0131na liderlik etmi\u015ftir.<\/strong><\/p>\n

Andrew Scott Cooper\u2019\u0131n Petrol Krallar\u0131: ABD, \u0130ran ve S.Arabistan Ortado\u011fu\u2019da G\u00fc\u00e7 Dengesini Nas\u0131l De\u011fi\u015ftirdi? Ba\u015fl\u0131kl\u0131 kitab\u0131nda detay\u0131yla anlatt\u0131\u011f\u0131 \u00fczere \u0130ran\u2019a kar\u015f\u0131 ilk Suud petrol sava\u015f\u0131, \u015eah\u2019\u0131n modernizasyon programlar\u0131n\u0131 zay\u0131flatmay\u0131 hedef al\u0131yordu. Suudiler \u0130ran\u2019\u0131n b\u00f6lgesel g\u00fc\u00e7 olarak y\u00fckseli\u015finden korku duymu\u015f ve o vakitler \u0130ran\u2019\u0131n h\u00e2kim oldu\u011fu OPEC\u2019te ba\u011f\u0131ms\u0131z karar alacaklar\u0131 bir alan yaratmak istemi\u015flerdi.<\/p>\n

\u015eah\u2019\u0131n h\u0131rsl\u0131 ama\u00e7lar\u0131 i\u00e7in y\u00fcksek petrol fiyatlar\u0131na a\u015f\u0131r\u0131 derecede ba\u011f\u0131ml\u0131 olmas\u0131 sayesinde Suudiler, petrol fiyatlar\u0131n\u0131n k\u00fcresel arz art\u0131\u015f\u0131yla frenlenmesinin \u0130ran\u2019\u0131n zay\u0131f noktas\u0131 oldu\u011funu kavram\u0131\u015flard\u0131. Cooper\u2019\u0131n kaydetti\u011fi \u00fczere, Suudiler y\u00fcksek petrol fiyatlar\u0131 hakk\u0131nda ABD\u2019deki kayg\u0131lar\u0131n da yard\u0131m\u0131yla planlar\u0131 do\u011frultusunda hareket etmesi i\u00e7in Washington\u2019\u0131 ikna etmi\u015flerdi. Nixon y\u00f6netiminin sonuna do\u011fru Suudiler pazar\u0131 petrolle doldurmu\u015flard\u0131.<\/p>\n

\u0130kinci petrol sava\u015f\u0131n\u0131n kokusu 1988\u2019de biten \u0130ran-Iran sava\u015f\u0131n\u0131n son demlerinde ortaya \u00e7\u0131kt\u0131. Sekiz y\u0131ll\u0131k \u00e7at\u0131\u015fma Basra K\u00f6rfezinin petrol ihracat\u0131n\u0131 tehdit etti\u011finden dolay\u0131 Suudiler ve Amerikal\u0131lar \u0130ran\u2019\u0131n y\u0131pratma sava\u015f\u0131yla zafer kazanma ihtimalinden korku duymaya ba\u015flam\u0131\u015flard\u0131.\u00a0 ABD D\u0131\u015fi\u015fleri Bakanl\u0131\u011f\u0131n\u0131n \u201cIran-Iraq War: Elements of U.S. Diplomatic Strategy and Plans\u201d ba\u015fl\u0131kl\u0131 1984 tarihli gizli bir belgesinde, Washington yakla\u015f\u0131m\u0131n\u0131n ana s\u00fctununun \u201cstratejik dengeyi muhafaza ederek ama Amerikan tarafs\u0131zl\u0131\u011f\u0131n\u0131 da koruyarak Irak\u2019\u0131n ma\u011flubiyetten uzak durmas\u0131na yard\u0131m etmek\u201d oldu\u011fu kaydediliyor. \u00c7at\u0131\u015fman\u0131n \u201ctanker sava\u015f\u0131na\u201d d\u00f6n\u00fc\u015fmesiyle birlikte Basra K\u00f6rfezi ge\u00e7i\u015fleri ciddi \u015fekilde azald\u0131 ve art\u0131k \u00e7at\u0131\u015fman\u0131n sona ermesi de \u00f6ncelikli hale geldi.<\/p>\n

ABD, di\u011fer \u00fclkeleri \u0130ran\u2019la silah ticaretini durdurmaya te\u015febb\u00fcs edip \u0130ran donanmas\u0131n\u0131 bile taciz ederken Suudiler bir kez daha piyasay\u0131 petrolle doldurdu. Amac\u0131, \u0130ran\u2019\u0131n sava\u015f kaynaklar\u0131n\u0131 kurutmakt\u0131. OPEC verilerine g\u00f6re Suudi Arabistan g\u00fcnl\u00fck petrol \u00fcretimini 1987\u2019de 3.9 milyar varilden 1988\u2019de 5.1 milyar varile, 1990\u2019da ise 6.4 milyar varile \u00e7\u0131kard\u0131. 1979-1980 petrol \u015foku y\u00fcz\u00fcnden petrol fiyatlar\u0131 \u00e7arp\u0131c\u0131 bi\u00e7imde azald\u0131\u011f\u0131ndan dolay\u0131 bu karar\u0131n ekonomik mant\u0131\u011f\u0131 pek yoksa da Suudiler Pehlevi hanedan\u0131n\u0131 etkileyen ayn\u0131 sistem a\u00e7\u0131\u011f\u0131n\u0131n Devrimci \u0130ran i\u00e7in de hala ge\u00e7erli oldu\u011funu anlam\u0131\u015ft\u0131.<\/p>\n

Suudiler her iki vakada da k\u0131sa vadeli ama\u00e7lar\u0131na ula\u015fmakta ba\u015far\u0131l\u0131 olmu\u015flard\u0131. Ancak uzun vadede kendi stratejik konumlar\u0131 daha da k\u00f6t\u00fcle\u015fti. \u015eah gelir kayb\u0131na haz\u0131rl\u0131kl\u0131 de\u011fildi ve devrimci ate\u015fi yok etmek i\u00e7in petrol servetini kullanam\u0131yordu. \u0130slam Cumhuriyetinin kurulmas\u0131 ve g\u00fc\u00e7l\u00fc bir monar\u015finin y\u0131k\u0131l\u0131\u015f emsali, Suudilere \u015eah\u2019\u0131n varl\u0131\u011f\u0131ndan daha fazla y\u00fck getirdi ve Suudi s\u0131n\u0131rlar\u0131 d\u00e2hilinde istikrars\u0131zl\u0131k ihtimalini de listeye ekledi.<\/p>\n

\u0130kinci petrol sava\u015f\u0131nda, Suudi hareketi Irak kar\u015f\u0131s\u0131nda \u0130ran\u2019\u0131n durumunu zay\u0131flatt\u0131 fakat bunun zor ekonomik \u015fartlar alt\u0131ndaki Ba\u011fdat\u2019\u0131 nas\u0131l etkileyece\u011fine dair pek bir fikir yoktu. Azalan petrol fiyatlar\u0131yla gelir kayb\u0131na u\u011frayan Saddam rejiminin g\u00f6z\u00fc d\u00f6nd\u00fc ve y\u0131k\u0131c\u0131 olaylar zinciri harekete ge\u00e7ti: Saddam r\u00f6van\u015fist tav\u0131rla Kuveyt\u2019i i\u015fgal etti ve ard\u0131ndan Amerika Irak\u2019\u0131n konvansiyonel askeri kapasitesini yok etti. \u00dclke iflas etti, sosyal yap\u0131 \u00e7\u00f6z\u00fcld\u00fc ve i\u015fgal edildi; ya\u015fayabilir bir siyasi varl\u0131k olarak i\u015flevi y\u0131llarca kayboldu. Bug\u00fcn yeni bir Irak siyasi d\u00fczeni, Suud\u2019un stratejik muhitini daha da a\u015f\u0131nd\u0131rm\u0131\u015ft\u0131r.<\/p>\n

Muhtemel serpinti\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 <\/strong><\/p>\n

\"\"\u00dc\u00e7\u00fcnc\u00fc bir Suud petrol sava\u015f\u0131n\u0131n s\u0131n\u0131rlar\u0131n\u0131 (S.Arabistan\u2019\u0131n mevcut savunmas\u0131zl\u0131klar\u0131n\u0131) ve potansiyel neticelerini (\u0130ran\u2019\u0131n muhtemel tepkilerini) takdir etmek \u00e7ok \u00f6nemlidir.<\/p>\n

Suudiler her ne kadar OPEC\u2019in kanat \u00fcreticisi olarak ani arz dalgalanmalar\u0131n\u0131 etkileyebilirse de pazar dinamiklerini esasl\u0131 olarak \u015fekillendirme kabiliyetleri baz\u0131 yeni bask\u0131lar y\u00fcz\u00fcnden ketlenmektedir. N\u00fcfus art\u0131\u015f\u0131 y\u00fcz\u00fcnden i\u00e7 t\u00fcketimin artmas\u0131ndan ve eksik planlanm\u0131\u015f s\u00fcbvansiyonlardan olu\u015fan zehirleyici karma, hidrokarbonlar\u0131n t\u00fckenme ihtimaliyle daha da k\u00f6t\u00fcle\u015fmektedir.<\/p>\n

Amerika\u2019n\u0131n Aramco\u2019nun eski ke\u015fif ve \u00fcretim m\u00fcd\u00fcr\u00fc Sedat el H\u00fcseyni ile g\u00f6r\u00fc\u015fmelerinin ortaya serildi\u011fi Wikileaks if\u015faatlar\u0131nda kaynaklar\u0131n azalmas\u0131na g\u00f6nderme yap\u0131l\u0131yordu. Yaz\u0131\u015fmalar\u0131n ortaya serdi\u011fine g\u00f6re Suud petrol rezervleri y\u00fczde 40 civar\u0131nda abart\u0131lm\u0131\u015ft\u0131r.<\/p>\n

Demografik de\u011fi\u015fim ya\u015fayan rant devletinin bu do\u011fal e\u011filimini Arap Devrimleri karma\u015f\u0131kla\u015ft\u0131rmaktad\u0131r; Arap Devrimleri, Suudi Krall\u0131\u011f\u0131n\u0131 ekonomik dolay\u0131s\u0131yla da siyasi huzursuzlu\u011fa son vermek i\u00e7in vatanda\u015f ba\u015f\u0131na 7.000 dolar sus pay\u0131 vermeye zorlad\u0131. Birbirine ba\u011fl\u0131 bu ikilemler, hakk\u0131nda zaten \u015f\u00fcphe duyulan Riyad\u2019\u0131n fiyat istikrar\u0131 sa\u011flama kapasitesinin ba\u015f\u0131na er ge\u00e7 i\u015f a\u00e7acakt\u0131r.<\/p>\n

\u00d6nemli bir di\u011fer etken de \u0130ran\u2019\u0131n Suudi Arabistan\u2019a misilleme ihtimalidir. Bu petrol sava\u015f\u0131nda, \u00f6nceki iki \u00f6rne\u011fin aksine, Suudiler a\u00e7\u0131k\u00e7a ortadalar. \u0130ran\u2019\u0131n Suudi eylemlerini ge\u00e7mi\u015fte kar\u015f\u0131l\u0131k verememesi, Arabistan\u2019\u0131 anlaml\u0131 \u015fekilde incitme kapasitesinin yoklu\u011fundand\u0131. Devrimci ayaklanman\u0131n dikkatleri da\u011f\u0131tt\u0131\u011f\u0131 Monar\u015fik \u0130ran\u2019\u0131n ve vah\u015fi bir \u00e7at\u0131\u015fmaya batm\u0131\u015f m\u00fcteakip \u0130slam Cumhuriyetinin Suud\u2019un davran\u0131\u015flar\u0131na muteber bir intikam tehdidiyle kar\u015f\u0131l\u0131k verme kabiliyeti yoktu. Ancak 21\u2019nci y\u00fczy\u0131l \u0130ran\u2019\u0131 \u00e7ok farkl\u0131d\u0131r.<\/p>\n

Y\u0131k\u0131c\u0131 \u0130ran-Irak sava\u015f\u0131, Bat\u0131 liderli\u011findeki m\u00fceyyideler, silah ambargolar\u0131 ve \u00f6rt\u00fcl\u00fc operasyonlar (en son siber sava\u015f \u015feklinde ya\u015fand\u0131) \u00fclkeyi asimetrik ulusal g\u00fcvenlik doktrini geli\u015ftirmeye mecbur etti. \u0130ran\u2019\u0131n duru\u015fu, yerlile\u015ftirilmi\u015f bir askeri-sanayi kompleksine, devletin siber g\u00fcvenli\u011fe ve siber sava\u015fa b\u00fcy\u00fck yat\u0131r\u0131m yapmas\u0131na ve m\u00fceyyidelerin en k\u00f6t\u00fc etkilerini bozabilecek \u00e7ok y\u00f6nl\u00fc bir ekonomiye dayal\u0131d\u0131r. Bat\u0131n\u0131n bu zaman kadar ki gayretleri, itaatk\u00e2r b\u00f6lgesel rejimlerin dan\u0131\u015f\u0131kl\u0131 d\u00f6v\u00fc\u015f\u00fcyle, zaman zaman \u0130ran\u2019\u0131n can\u0131n\u0131 ciddi \u015fekilde yaksa da nih\u00e2i sonu\u00e7 al\u0131nmam\u0131\u015f; \u0130ran\u2019a \u00f6\u011frenme ve intibak alan\u0131 sa\u011flam\u0131\u015ft\u0131r.<\/p>\n

Krizin t\u0131rmanmas\u0131 halinde, Suudi Arabistan\u2019a kar\u015f\u0131 misillemenin hem i\u00e7 siyasi ve ekonomik sahada hem de b\u00f6lgesel sahada ger\u00e7ekle\u015fmesi muhtemeldir. Suudiler \u00fclke i\u00e7i meselelere m\u00fcdahale \u00fczerinden yap\u0131lacak sabotajlara kar\u015f\u0131 savunmas\u0131z durumdalar fakat hayati altyap\u0131lar\u0131 da ayn\u0131 durumda. Aramco\u2019ya d\u00fczenlenen siber sald\u0131r\u0131; Basra K\u00f6rfezindeki y\u00fckleme tesisleri ve su ar\u0131tma tesislerinin savunmas\u0131zl\u0131\u011f\u0131 bunu g\u00f6stermektedir. B\u00f6lgesel olarak ise, \u0130ran\u2019\u0131n Yemen\u2019de i\u00e7ten i\u00e7e kaynayan i\u00e7 sava\u015f\u0131 ve Bahreyn\u2019deki siyasi karga\u015fay\u0131 fenala\u015ft\u0131rma ihtimali, Suudi kaynaklar\u0131n\u0131 onlara \u00e7ok ihtiya\u00e7 duyulan bir zamanda bo\u015faltacakt\u0131r.<\/p>\n

S.Arabistan\u2019daki yeni i\u00e7 dinamiklerin bask\u0131s\u0131, yan\u0131s\u0131ra \u0130ran\u2019\u0131n \u015fiddetli tepkisi, \u0130ran ihracat\u0131na kar\u015f\u0131 mevcut Suud petrol sava\u015f\u0131n\u0131n daha zay\u0131f olmas\u0131 ve \u2013 reklam edildi\u011finin aksine \u2013 daha k\u0131sa s\u00fcreli olaca\u011f\u0131 anlam\u0131n\u0131 ta\u015f\u0131r. \u0130\u00e7 g\u00fcvenlik, siyasi istikrar ve b\u00f6lgesel stratejik ihtiya\u00e7lar i\u00e7in ilave harcamalar\u0131n test etti\u011fi Suudi Arabistan\u2019\u0131n ac\u0131 e\u015fi\u011finin \u0130ran\u2019a kar\u015f\u0131 petrol sava\u015f\u0131nda ihracat politikalar\u0131n\u0131 etkileyece\u011fi yer buras\u0131d\u0131r. \u0130ran \u00fczerindeki Amerikan m\u00fceyyideleri \u0130ran\u2019\u0131 b\u00fct\u00e7e harcamalar\u0131n\u0131 yeniden d\u00fczenlemeye ittiyse de \u0130ran ihracat\u0131 \u00fczerindeki genel sald\u0131r\u0131, Suudi Arabistan\u2019\u0131n uzun vadeli z\u0131mni muvafakat\u0131na esasl\u0131 bir \u015fekilde ba\u011fl\u0131d\u0131r.<\/p>\n

Riyad \u00fczerindeki yeni bask\u0131lar, m\u00fceyyide te\u015febb\u00fcs\u00fcnde ge\u00e7mi\u015fte oynad\u0131klar\u0131 o ayn\u0131 rol\u00fc icra etmekte zorlanacaklar\u0131n\u0131 telkin etmekte, \u0130ran\u2019\u0131n teslim olmas\u0131n\u0131 veya ekonomik \u00e7\u00f6k\u00fc\u015f ya\u015famas\u0131n\u0131 masadaki kartlardan \u00e7\u0131karmaktad\u0131r. Suudilerin k\u00fcresel talebi yat\u0131\u015ft\u0131ramamas\u0131, m\u00fceyyidelerin k\u00fcresel petrol fiyatlar\u0131nda tehlikeye att\u0131\u011f\u0131 durumlar\u0131n daha da sorgulanmas\u0131na yol a\u00e7acakt\u0131r: Yani \u0130ran ve ABD aras\u0131ndaki ihtilaf y\u00fcz\u00fcnden pazarlar\u0131n y\u00fcksek enerji fiyatlar\u0131na katlanma isteklili\u011fi.<\/p>\n

Suudilerin Tahran\u2019\u0131 zay\u0131flatmak i\u00e7in kullan\u0131ld\u0131\u011f\u0131 \u0130ran-ABD ihtilaf\u0131na siyasi bir \u00e7\u00f6z\u00fcm bulunmazsa, \u0130ran petrol\u00fc \u00fczerindeki son m\u00fceyyideler en nihayet \u00e7\u00f6z\u00fclecektir. Fakat birinci ve ikinci Suud petrol sava\u015flar\u0131nda oldu\u011fu \u00fczere, yan etkilerini tahmin etmek zor olacakt\u0131r.<\/p>\n

Kaynak: Enerji Enstit\u00fcs\u00fc<\/a><\/p>","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

Sorry, this entry is only available in Turkish. For the sake of viewer convenience, the content is shown below in the alternative language. You may click the link to switch the active language.Prens T\u00fcrk\u00ee el Faysal, Tahran\u2019\u0131n k\u00fcresel ekonomiye petrol ihracat\u0131n\u0131n yerini alma aray\u0131\u015f\u0131yla, ge\u00e7en y\u0131l Suud\u2019un Amerikan liderli\u011findeki \u0130ran\u2019a kar\u015f\u0131 m\u00fceyyidelere kat\u0131laca\u011f\u0131n\u0131 s\u00f6ylerken yeni […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":8421,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":[],"categories":[53,44],"tags":[1198,67,1333,1377,59,79,628,3606,3607],"views":692,"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.enerjigazetesi.ist\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/8420"}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.enerjigazetesi.ist\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.enerjigazetesi.ist\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.enerjigazetesi.ist\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.enerjigazetesi.ist\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=8420"}],"version-history":[{"count":1,"href":"https:\/\/www.enerjigazetesi.ist\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/8420\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":8422,"href":"https:\/\/www.enerjigazetesi.ist\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/8420\/revisions\/8422"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.enerjigazetesi.ist\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/8421"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.enerjigazetesi.ist\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=8420"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.enerjigazetesi.ist\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=8420"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.enerjigazetesi.ist\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=8420"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}