{"id":121309,"date":"2020-10-02T17:29:06","date_gmt":"2020-10-02T14:29:06","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.enerjigazetesi.ist\/?p=121309"},"modified":"2020-10-02T17:54:13","modified_gmt":"2020-10-02T14:54:13","slug":"cin-kuresel-enerji-piyasalarinin-agirlik-merkezi-oldu","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.enerjigazetesi.ist\/en\/cin-kuresel-enerji-piyasalarinin-agirlik-merkezi-oldu\/","title":{"rendered":"The Global Energy Trade\u2019s New Center of Gravity"},"content":{"rendered":"<p><\/p>\n<h1><strong>China has become the center of gravity for global energy markets. While energy demand growth has slowed or stopped in the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries, China\u2019s primary energy demand increased by more than 45% over the last decade.\u00a0Going forward, the question is whether such growth will continue and how China\u2019s energy system will change in response to the dual challenges of climate change and local pollution.<\/strong><\/h1>\n<p><strong>China<\/strong> is highly dependent on <strong>fossil fuel imports. I<\/strong>t is the world\u2019s largest importer of <strong>oil<\/strong> and<strong> natural gas<\/strong>\u00a0and is an <strong>important coal importer<\/strong> as well. At the same time, China is striving to lead in <img loading=\"lazy\" class=\"alignright wp-image-121311\" src=\"https:\/\/www.enerjigazetesi.ist\/wp-content\/uploads\/2020\/10\/cin-kuresel-enerji-piyasalarinin-agirlik-merkezi-oldu.jpg\" alt=\"\" width=\"320\" height=\"162\" srcset=\"https:\/\/www.enerjigazetesi.ist\/wp-content\/uploads\/2020\/10\/cin-kuresel-enerji-piyasalarinin-agirlik-merkezi-oldu.jpg 699w, https:\/\/www.enerjigazetesi.ist\/wp-content\/uploads\/2020\/10\/cin-kuresel-enerji-piyasalarinin-agirlik-merkezi-oldu-300x152.jpg 300w, https:\/\/www.enerjigazetesi.ist\/wp-content\/uploads\/2020\/10\/cin-kuresel-enerji-piyasalarinin-agirlik-merkezi-oldu-500x253.jpg 500w, https:\/\/www.enerjigazetesi.ist\/wp-content\/uploads\/2020\/10\/cin-kuresel-enerji-piyasalarinin-agirlik-merkezi-oldu-80x40.jpg 80w\" sizes=\"(max-width: 320px) 100vw, 320px\" \/><strong>new energy technologies<\/strong>, particularly <strong>wind and solar electricity<\/strong> generation and electric vehicles. To understand how China fits into <strong>energy markets<\/strong> and how energy shapes its policy, examining the electricity and <strong>oil<\/strong> and<strong> gas industries<\/strong> separately is illustrative. China is more in charge of its own fate in electricity, while it remains highly vulnerable to market conditions and <strong>supply shocks<\/strong> in <strong>oil<\/strong> and <strong>gas<\/strong>.<\/p>\n<div class=\"inline-widget alignright\">\n<div class=\"inline-widget-inner\"><\/div>\n<\/div>\n<h2>ELECTRICITY<\/h2>\n<p>As a result of <strong>rapid economic growth<\/strong>, <strong>demand for electricity in China<\/strong> in <strong>2019<\/strong> was more than five times its level in <strong>2000.<\/strong> Demand growth slowed slightly in the last decade, but still averaged about<strong> 7%<\/strong> per year.<a id=\"footref-3\" class=\"smooth-scroll\" href=\"https:\/\/www.brookings.edu\/articles\/the-global-energy-trades-new-center-of-gravity\/#footnote-3\"><\/a>\u00a0As a result,<strong> China<\/strong> has added<strong> vast generation capacity<\/strong> of every type.<\/p>\n<p><strong>Coal still dominates<\/strong> the <strong>Chinese power sector,<\/strong> although its share of generation dropped from its high point of<strong> 81%<\/strong> in <strong>2007<\/strong> to <strong>66%<\/strong> in <strong>2019<\/strong>.\u00a0During the decade from <strong>2000-2019<\/strong>, China added <strong>493 gigawatts<\/strong> of <strong>coal-fired generation<\/strong> capacity. Natural <strong>gas generation<\/strong> has also grown rapidly since <strong>2014,<\/strong> but from a much smaller base, and reached<strong> 3.2%<\/strong> of <strong>Chinese power generation<\/strong> in<strong> 2019.<\/strong><\/p>\n<p>Coal additions were particularly rapid during the 12th Five-Year Plan, from 2011 through 2015, as China encouraged the construction of coal-fired power plants to stimulate growth as the economy recovered from the global financial crisis. However, this situation led to overcapacity, and the subsequent 13th Five-Year Plan, for 2016 through 2020, aimed to contain growth in coal-fired power.\u00a0Nonetheless, China is still experiencing overcapacity of coal-fired generation, with its plants running at less than 50% of capacity on average in 2019.<\/p>\n<p>The upcoming 14th Five-Year Plan, for 2021 through 2025, will be a key document in mapping the future of China\u2019s electricity system. China\u2019s Nationally Determined Contribution (NDC) under the Paris Agreement calls for its greenhouse gas emissions to peak no later than 2030. However, the behemoth State Grid Corporation and the China Electricity Council are both pushing for inclusion of more coal-fired power in the new plan, in part to encourage economic recovery from the COVID-19 pandemic.\u00a0Building more coal, even the most efficient ultra-supercritical plants, is not consistent with China meeting its NDC, and certainly not consistent with the world\u2019s overall climate goals.<\/p>\n<p><em>As demand for new coal-fired power plants has declined in China, the country is financing and building significant new capacity abroad\u2026<\/em><\/p>\n<p>As demand for new coal-fired power plants has declined in China, the country is financing and building significant new capacity abroad, particularly through the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). As of 2017, China had committed to or offered financing for more than one-quarter of the world\u2019s coal-fired capacity being built outside of China, often with Chinese companies as the engineering, procurement, and construction contractors. Additionally, 23% of these projects are for subcritical technology, the least advanced and most polluting form of coal-fired generation.\u00a0China is becoming the lender of last resort for coal-fired generation, as many international banks are no longer financing coal-fired power projects. An important goal of financing these projects abroad is to keep excess Chinese industrial capacity working.<\/p>\n<p>However, BRI also raises concerns about \u201cwhite elephant\u201d projects and debt traps in countries that can scarcely afford them. Construction of coal-fired power capacity is no exception. For example, plans for a 6.6 gigawatt coal-fired power plant in Egypt were postponed indefinitely because of concerns about over-capacity and a growing preference for renewable electricity. Similar concerns have been expressed about planned facilities in Pakistan and Bangladesh as power demand falls due to the COVID-19 pandemic, but so far these projects are still going forward, despite overcapacity in power generation.<\/p>\n<p>The rapid growth in China\u2019s renewable energy sector also gets a lot of attention, and rightly so.\u00a0 Over the last decade, China added 36% of the world\u2019s total new renewable (wind and solar) generation capacity. At their peak in 2017, wind and solar capacity additions in China were 45% of the global total. \u00a0Despite these vast additions, in 2019 wind and solar together still made up less than 10% of China\u2019s power generation, with wind at 5.5% and solar at 3.0%.<\/p>\n<p><strong>Source:<\/strong> <a href=\"https:\/\/www.brookings.edu\/articles\/the-global-energy-trades-new-center-of-gravity\/\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"nofollow noopener\">Brookings.Edu<\/a><\/p>","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>China has become the center of gravity for global energy markets. While energy demand growth has slowed or stopped in the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries, China\u2019s primary energy demand increased by more than 45% over the last decade.\u00a0Going forward, the question is whether such growth will continue and how China\u2019s energy [&hellip;]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":121311,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":[],"categories":[46,51,53,24649,44],"tags":[42501,80328,886,80320,42602,9630,43643,48453,3804,77707,52379,52259,80322,610,80331,46594,80333,5982,46581,80321,77706,80329,68703,80334,75151,80330,43609,27427,21298,80319,80335,80332,8551],"views":112,"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.enerjigazetesi.ist\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/121309"}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.enerjigazetesi.ist\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.enerjigazetesi.ist\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.enerjigazetesi.ist\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.enerjigazetesi.ist\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=121309"}],"version-history":[{"count":2,"href":"https:\/\/www.enerjigazetesi.ist\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/121309\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":121314,"href":"https:\/\/www.enerjigazetesi.ist\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/121309\/revisions\/121314"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.enerjigazetesi.ist\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/121311"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.enerjigazetesi.ist\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=121309"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.enerjigazetesi.ist\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=121309"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.enerjigazetesi.ist\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=121309"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}